AI Arms Races: Implications for Global Stability

Authors

  • Damián Tuset Varela Researcher at the University of Jaén. Tutor at the UOC. Head of Section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation

Keywords:

Artificial Intelligence, Arms Races, Global Stability, Arms Control, Military Ethics

Abstract

This study explores the emerging impact of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies on global military dynamics, focusing on how the adoption of AI systems in the defense domain can catalyze new arms races. The implications of these trends for global stability are assessed, identifying specific risks associated with escalation, strategic instability, and the erosion of international norms. Finally, governance and arms control strategies designed to mitigate these risks in the context of international security are proposed.

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies into military arsenals has ushered in a new era of arms races, with profound implications for global stability. This article examines how the adoption of AI in military applications is redefining defense strategies, accelerating weapons competitions, and posing unique challenges to international security. Through multidisciplinary analysis, risks of escalation and strategic instability are explored, and a framework for governance and arms control adapted to the AI era is proposed.

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Published

21-07-2021

How to Cite

[1]
D. Tuset Varela, “AI Arms Races: Implications for Global Stability”, J. Computational Intel. & Robotics, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 1–5, Jul. 2021.

Issue

Vol. 1 No. 2 (2021): Journal of Computational Intelligence and Robotics

Section

Articles

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